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Abstract 
 
This paper tests whether people can exercise self-control in limiting consumption of unwanted 
food and whether they can pre-empt their future lack of self-control by restricting the availability 
of food. An experiment was conducted with Stanford University undergraduates over a period of 
7 weeks in which some participants were given a fixed number of candies by the experimenter 
and other participants were allowed to choose the number of candies that they wanted to possess. 
The results yielded partial support of the hypotheses: although participants in the choice 
condition chose to possess only a few candies every week, they consumed more candies than 
participants in the no-choice condition, who possessed many more candies every week. The 
results are explained by cognitive dissonance theory and reactance theory in social psychology. 
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1. Introduction 
  The rational person of neoclassical economics, one endowed with consummate 
selfishness, perfect foresight, stable preferences, and a well-defined utility function seems to be 
an academic myth. Instead, real people are often not so selfish (e.g., Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, 
and Sefton 1994), have less than perfect foresight (e.g., Ariely and Wertenbroch 2004), do not 
have stable preferences (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1981), and probably do not have anything 
resembling a utility function (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Whereas neoclassical 
economics assumes that people have one particular model of making intertemporal choices and 
have perfect self-control, a large body of research indicates that such is not the case. Instead, 
people often have difficulty comparing intertemporal outcomes, often change their mind as the 
time interval changes, and have significantly less than perfect self-control (Frederick, 
Loewenstein, and Prelec 2002). 
  People’s inability to make optimal intertemporal choices is probably a significant 
contributor to the substantial increase in obesity in the U.S. over the past two decades. Cheaper 
food and readily available food should be strictly welfare increasing according to the standard 
neoclassical economics model. But people with self-control problems may not be able to 
optimally restrain consumption to account for the health costs associated with being overweight 
or obese (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Nevertheless, people can have some insight into their 
future lack of self-control and can take steps to overcome their future lack of control (Ariely and 
Wertenbroch 2004). If people do indeed see over-eating as a failure in self-control, they may 
take steps to restrict the availability of unhealthy food. If such were indeed the case, then it 
would be welfare-improving for an external agency (like the government) to restrict the 
availability of unhealthy food to assist people in overcoming their lack of self-control. I Krishna Savani  2  May 10, 2005 
 
conducted an experiment to test whether people indeed choose to restrict the availability of 
unhealthy food to pre-empt their future lack of self-control. 
  The paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature on hyperbolic 
discounting and obesity; section 3 presents the study design; section 4 outlines the hypotheses 
tested by the study; section 5 presents the detailed methods; section 6 analyzes the results; and 
section 7 concludes with a discussion of the findings. 
 
2. Literature review 
Hyperbolic Discounting 
  Extensive research in behavioral economics shows that people often make short-sited 
decisions that favor present consumption over future consumption, even if present consumption 
is disadvantageous in the long run (see Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002, for a 
review). For example, people often prefer a less amount now to a slightly larger amount after a 
fixed delay, but when both amounts are delayed by the same period of time, people often prefer 
the larger, later amount to the smaller, earlier amount (Fristoe and Myerson 1994; Kirby and 
Herrnstein 1995; Millar and Navarick 1984). To illustrate, people often prefer $100 now to $110 
in a day, but nearly always prefer $110 in 31 days to $100 in 30 days, a temporal preference 
reversal that the standard exponential discounting model of neoclassical economics cannot 
account for.  
  Such short-sightedness runs contrary to the exponential discounting model, which is the 
standard model for intertemporal consumption in neoclassical economics (Samuelson, 1937). 
The exponential discounting model gives a person’s preferences for consumption profiles over 
different time periods by claiming that the (present) utility of a consumption profile is the sum of Krishna Savani  3  May 10, 2005 
 
the discounted utilities of each individual consumption points; consumption in each time period 
is discounted by the same discount rate δ (between 0 and 1, inclusive) for each unit of time until 
the realization of the consumption. Although mathematically tractable, the exponential 
discounting model has little psychological validity. Nevertheless, the exponential discounting 
model has been treated as normative model of intertemporal choice by economists. 
  There are a number of other empirical regularities that the exponential discounting model 
cannot account for, some of which are summarized below (see Frederick et al. 2002 for details): 
1) people’s average annual discount rates generally decrease over time, in that (dn) is decreasing 
in n (Thaler 1981; Chapman 1996; Redelmeier and Heller 1993); 2) a hyperbolic discount 
function with decreasing discount rates fits experimental data better than a constant discount rate 
function of standard neoclassical economics (Kirby 1997); 3)gains are discounted at a higher rate 
than losses (Thaler 1981; MacKeigan, Larson, Draugalis, Bootman, and Burns 1993); 4) small 
amounts are discounted more than large amounts (Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil 1989; 
Loewenstein 1987; Raineri and Rachlin 1993); 4) people prefer improving sequences to 
decreasing sequences over time, even if decreasing sequences yielded a substantially larger total 
sum of money  (Frederick and Loewenstein 2002; Loewenstein and Prelec 1993); and 5) non-
independence of preferences for different sequences of outcomes (Loewenstein and Prelec 1993) 
  A natural question arises: these anomalies are mistakes according to the normative 
exponential discounting model, but do people also consider these patterns as mistakes? For 
example, many of the heuristics and biases discovered by Tversky and Kahneman (1974; see 
also Kahneman and Tversky 1973), such as availability, representativeness, and anchoring, are 
acknowledged by participants as mistakes once participants are confronted with the anomaly 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1983); indeed, participants acknowledge their mistakes even though Krishna Savani  4  May 10, 2005 
 
their original responses still seem highly intuitive. Nevertheless, when participants are presented 
with their temporally inconsistent responses in hyperbolic choice questions, they do not see 
themselves as having made a mistake. Frederick (1996) found that the discrepancy between 
discount rates for different amounts is higher when participants make both judgments 
simultaneously than when they make separate judgments, suggesting that people consider 
different discount rates to be acceptable. Similarly, Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) showed 
participants that a decreasing wage profile ($27,000, $26,000, ... , $23,000) provided strictly 
more consumption than an increasing wage profile ($23,000, $24,000, ... , $27000), but 
nevertheless, a majority of participants preferred the increasing wage profile to the decreasing 
one. Such findings suggest that most people do not believe that the exponential discounting 
model is a normative model. 
  The most widely accepted alternative model exponential discounting is the quasi-
hyperbolic discount function proposed by Laibson (1994, 1997). The model specifies discount 
rates as: 
 
In this function, both β and δ are between 0 and 1; whereas δ can be understood as the usual 
constant discount rate, β refers to the premium given to consumption in the present time period. 
Therefore, this model predicts that a person’s discount rate between the present time period and 
the next time period will be greater than the discount rate between any two consecutive time 
periods in the future; the discount rate decreases from the present time period to the next, but 
then stays constant (Laibson 1997). The hyperbolic discounting model predicts experimental data 
between than the standard exponential discounting model. Krishna Savani  5  May 10, 2005 
 
  Hyperbolic discounting can have significant consequences for many macroeconomic and 
microeconomic phenomena. Laibson’s (1997) model of a consumer with hyperbolic discounting 
and access to an imperfect commitment device predicts some important empirical regularities 
that cannot be explained by standard neoclassical economics: the high correlation between 
people’s consumption and their income, people’s asset specific marginal propensities to 
consume, and low levels of precautionary savings. Laibson suggests that too much liquidity may 
be counterproductive for people with hyperbolic discounting: at any given point in time, they 
may want to postpone consumption to a later period than to an earlier period (both in the future), 
but as soon as the earlier period is realized, people would want to reverse their prior decision and 
to consume in the current period. Similarly, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001) showed how 
hyperbolic discounting can explain repeated procrastination.  
  In an application of hyperbolic discounting to developmental economics, Ashraf, Karlan, 
and Yin (2004) showed that people can predict their lack of self-control in the future and thereby 
take remedial steps in the present to maintain their pre-commitment to self-control. Ashraf et al. 
(2004) devised a new savings product at a bank in the Philippines for people who wanted to 
commit themselves to saving money in the future. Nearly 30% of the participants who were 
offered this product opened an account, and participants who exhibited more hyperbolic 
discounting on a hypothetical questionnaire were more likely to open an account. Participants 
who opened a new savings account saved over 80% more than those who did not. These results 
suggest that people can predict their lack of self control and are able to take remedial steps to 
preclude their future indulgence. 
  Other research also indicates that people can predict their hyperbolic discounting to some 
extent, but not completely so. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2004) asked executive education students Krishna Savani  6  May 10, 2005 
 
at MIT’s Sloan School of Business to write 3 papers for a class and were either given externally 
imposed deadlines or were allowed to set their deadlines themselves. Both groups of participants 
were given a fixed penalty for each late day beyond the deadline, whether externally imposed or 
self-imposed. Exhibiting pre-commitment to timely completion of homework, many students 
who got to choose deadline did indeed impose temporally spaced deadlines. However, only a few 
students selected equally spaced deadlines, and those who did received better grades on their 
papers. The results suggest that people may often be aware of their future lack of self-control but 
that they cannot predict their hyperbolic discounting perfectly (see O’Donoghue and Rabin 2004 
for a discussion).  
  In many cases, although people are aware that they will be better off with postponing 
consumption, they are unable to make themselves do so. As an extreme example of this 
phenomenon, addictive drugs alter the brain’s chemistry such that addicts cannot restrain 
themselves from consuming drugs even if they are fully aware of the negative consequences of 
consumption, and indeed, of the lack of any pleasure from consumption (Bernheim and Rangel 
forthcoming). In a less extreme case, people may realize the negative consequences of 
consuming unhealthy foods but be unable to restrain themselves if the food is easily available.  
 
Obesity 
  The problem of present vs. future consumption may be a central cause for obesity, which 
is a major cause for public concern in the United States. The average weight of American adults 
has increased 12 pounds from the early 1960s to the mid 1990s (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 1996), while 30% of people are clinically obese presently, up from 16% in the 
early seventies (Center for Disease Control 2003). In particular, students gain a significant Krishna Savani  7  May 10, 2005 
 
amount of weight during high school, with 10% of high school students being clinically obese 
and another 16% being overweight (Center for Disease Control 1999). Rates of obesity are 
growing in other developed countries too, but nowhere has the rise in obesity been as sharp as in 
the United States. 
  Overweight and obese people have significantly higher chances of disease and death than 
do non-overweight people (World Health Organization 2000). More importantly than the average 
increase in weight more the past two decades, researchers have observed that the right tail of the 
distribution has been growing particularly faster. So not only are more people overweight, a lot 
more people are exceedingly overweight and particularly susceptible to health and other risks 
associated with obesity.  
  Increase in weight can be accounted for by an increase in calories consumed or a 
decrease in calories expended. On average, excess consumption of about 3,500 calories leads to 
an increase of 1 pound in weight (Bhargava and Guthrie 2002). Estimating a model of calorie 
expenditure given a person’s weight, Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro (2003) found that an increase 
of about 100-150 calories a day can account for the increase in weight gain over the past two 
decades (see also Schofield, Schofield, and James 1985 for discussion of the model). But data 
from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2000) indicate that the supply of calories from food 
has increased from 3,200 calories in 1978 to 3,900 calories in 1999. After accounting for waste, 
the net increase of 400 calories is much more than needed to explain the increase in weight over 
the same period. Energy expenditure on exercise can also account for the discrepancy between 
weight gained and calories consumed, but the studies reviewed by Cutler, Glaser, and Shapiro 
(2003) indicate that energy expenditure has stayed fairly constant over the past two decades and 
thus would have minimal impact on weight gain.  Krishna Savani  8  May 10, 2005 
 
  In their influential analysis, Cutler et al. (2003) formulated a theoretical model for the 
increase of obesity in America. Their primary argument is that improved food processing 
technologies contributed to weight gain by reducing the time required to prepare food by half. In 
1965, the average amount of time required to prepare food and to clean up was 130 minutes, but 
has now decreased to less than 70 minutes (Robinson and Godbey 1997). Appliances such as 
microwave ovens and better refrigerators have also contributed to reduced preparation time. 
Decreased time cost for food can lead to an increase in the consumption of food as per standard 
supply-demand analysis. Although decreased time cost can lead to an increase in the amount of 
food consumed at each meal, Cutler et al. claim that the effect is primarily driven by a wider 
variety of food consumed and more meals consumed per day rather than more food consumed at 
any given meal. 
 
Obesity and Hyperbolic Discounting 
  Decreasing food prices can increase food consumption by the standard supply-demand 
mechanism. In addition, decreased time to prepare food can also increase consumption by 
reducing the time cost of food. In addition, lower time costs can also increase consumption if 
people do not have adequate self-control, despite the standard assumption that people will 
consume exactly that amount of food that will maximize their utility. People’s overeating despite 
being on a diet exemplifies this problem (Cummings 2003; Cutler et al. 2003). Over-consuming 
food can also lead to significant health costs in the future and reduces the purchasing power for 
non-food items.  
  Cutler et al. (2003) suggest that people with quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 
1997), who trade present consumption with future consumption at a higher rate than they trade Krishna Savani  9  May 10, 2005 
 
consumption in future states, may continuously procrastinate dieting because immediate 
consumption gives substantial gratification. Their model claims that the optimal amount of food 
consumption should be such that the product of the marginal utility of food and the discount 
factor (for time elapsed between decision to consume food and actual consumption of food) 
equals the marginal time cost of food.  
  In most cases, only a short time elapses between the decision to consume food and the 
actual consumption of food; this time difference is generally trivial for exponential discounting 
but can be considerable for hyperbolic discounting, given the large weight given to present 
consumption. If food preparation takes a long time, the delay between the decision and the action 
may be long enough to prevent hyperbolic persons from over-consuming; but the time required 
to prepare food is short enough, as it is presently, then hyperbolic people may end up over-
consuming against their long term interests and goals.  
  This self-control problem is often found in real life: hungry high school students may go 
to a vending machine in their cafeteria to get fatty candies and cookies, but they may not be 
willing to walk 10 minutes to a candy store that is located outside their school because of both 
the trouble of walking and the time delay to final consumption. In many cases, not eating the 
candies and cookies is in the students’ long run interests, so restricted availability of food may 
have negative welfare consequences for people with extreme hyperbolic discounting, whereas 
they would have positive welfare consequences for people with exponential discounting, if such 
people exist. Decrease in the time required to prepare food would also have similar negative 
consequences for people with self-control problems. Over-consumption of food would reduce 
people’s purchasing power for non-food items and lead to worse health in the future, although 
the health cost would probably outweigh the purchasing power cost by far for most people.  Krishna Savani  10  May 10, 2005 
 
  Nevertheless, Cutler et al. claim that the 20-minute reduction in the time cost of food 
outweighs the negative consequences of increased calorie intake. The increase of 100-150 
calories per day can be compensated by 15 minutes of exercise per day, and people would still 
have an additional 5 minutes left over. People who do not exercise for an additional 15 minute 
probably value the weight loss less than 15 minutes of exercise, so their welfare would also 
increase. But the calorie-time tradeoff may be welfare-reducing for people with self-control 
problems: such people may vow to exercise every day but procrastinate exercising whenever the 
time to exercise arrives (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Nevertheless, Cutler et al. claim that 
only people with extreme self-control problems will gain a significant amount of weight, while a 
large majority of the people can adjust consumption optimally to balance out the immediate 
pleasure from consuming food with the future negative consequences of weight gain by 
exercising enough. 
  In contrast to Cutler et al.’s claim, I suspect that most people cannot optimally restrict 
food consumption when the food is readily available, although they may be able to restrict 
consumption when the food is not readily available. If so, then people may be aware of their 
inability to make optimal tradeoffs with easily available food and may successfully take steps to 
overcome this shortcoming. In the present study, I plan to test the hypothesis that people are 
aware of their self-control problem and will restrict the availability of junk food to prevent 
themselves from consuming excess food. The hypothesis suggests that the easy availability of 
food, particularly that of unhealthy food, may indeed be welfare reducing for most people and 
that foreseeing their lack of self-control, people are willing to restrict the easy availability of 
food. If supported, the hypothesis suggests that external regulations restricting the availability of 
unhealthy food would be welfare increasing. Krishna Savani  11  May 10, 2005 
 
  The present study has also important implications for high school students’ weight gain. 
People in favor of junk food and soda machines near high schools assume that students can make 
optimal tradeoffs between present and future consumption and therefore, will consume an 
optimal amount of junk food that targets an optimal future weight. But my study may show that 
high school students may be consuming soda and junk food just because the food is easily 
available, even if they do not want to consume the food (Bernheim and Rangel forthcoming). If 
the availability of junk food near high schools is restricted, students may be able to exercise self-
control successfully and not gain weight. If the results support my hypothesis, then restricting the 
easy availability of unhealthy food may make a significant contribution to reducing obesity. 
 
Limited Self-control 
  Excessive hyperbolic discounting may act both as a psychological trait and as a 
psychological state. People may exhibit self-control problems in certain situations but not in 
other situations. Integrating a large body of literature, Muraven and Baumeister (2000) claim that 
self-control is a limited resource, that after exercising self-control for a certain period of time, 
people’s capacity for exercising self-control decreases even in unrelated domains. For example, 
Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister (1998) found that participants who were told to regulate their 
emotional response while watching an upsetting movie later showed reduced stamina by pressing 
a handgrip for a shorter period of time. In a second study, the same authors also found that 
participants who were told to suppress certain thoughts later gave up quickly on an anagram 
solving task (see also Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice 1998; Tice, Bratslavsky, and 
Baumeister 2001; Vohs, Baumeister, and Ciarocco 2005).  Krishna Savani  12  May 10, 2005 
 
  Since excessive hyperbolic discounting is essentially a self-control problem (Frederick et 
al. 2002), it is possible that people can have high hyperbolic discounting in certain circumstances 
and low hyperbolic discounting in others. Therefore, people may be particularly prone to 
overeating readily available food when their self-control resources are depleted, such as under 
times of stress or increased workload. For college students, successive weeks of the quarter are 
often accompanied with both increased stress and workload, so students may exhibit increasing 
hyperbolic discounting over the quarter. Therefore, self-control resources may moderate the 
impact of food availability on consumption. This hypothesis suggests that restricting the 
availability of unhealthy food to people under cognitive or emotional load may be particularly 
welfare increasing. 
 
3. Design 
  Consistent with the analogy to high school candy and soda machines, I attempted to 
replicate a candy machine in students’ dorm rooms. There were 2 conditions in the study: the no-
choice condition and the choice condition. Participants in no the no-choice condition were given 
a number of candies every week, some healthy and some unhealthy, and they had to pay a certain 
amount for each candy; they could eat as many of the candies as they wanted and their candy bag 
was replenished at the beginning of the following week. Participants in the choice condition went 
through the same procedures as participants in the no-choice condition, except that they could 
choose the amount of candy to keep with themselves every week.  
  Since participants would not have to pay for candies that they did not eat, it would be 
welfare-increasing for rational participants in the choice condition to hoard a large number of 
candies so that they can consume as many candies as is utility maximizing. In contrast, Krishna Savani  13  May 10, 2005 
 
hyperbolic participants in the choice group may end up over-consuming candies beyond the 
utility maximizing limit because the candies are easily available; for such participants, restricting 
the number of candies available would be a better decision. Therefore, my experiment provided a 
clear test of whether people can predict their lack of future self-control. 
  The no-choice group was similar to a group of high school students who have a candy 
machine close to their school, whereas the choice group was like a group of high school students 
who could decide how much candy to put in the candy machine to start with. Since the study was 
conducted over a period of many weeks, I could analyze participants’ consumption trends over 
the quarter. 
  The study was conducted over 7 weeks of the quarter. Since class workload typically 
increases throughout the quarter, students may have decreasing resources available for self-
control over the course of the study. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
1)  Participants in the choice group will choose less than 10 candies per week. 
2)  Participants in the no-choice group will consume more candies than those in the choice 
group. 
3)  Participants in the choice group will choose more candies over successive weeks of the 
study. 
4)  Of the candies chosen, participants in the choice group will choose a greater percentage of 
unhealthy candies over successive weeks of the study. 
5)  Participants in both groups will consume more candies over successive weeks of the study. Krishna Savani  14  May 10, 2005 
 
6)  Of the candies consumed, participants in both groups will choose a greater percentage of 
unhealthy candies over successive weeks of the study. 
 
5. Methods 
Participants 
  A total of 68 (34 women, 34 men) students took part in the study. Of these, 30 (15 
women, 15 men) were in the no-choice condition and 38 (19 women, 19 men) were in the choice 
condition. All participants were freshmen students residing in all-freshmen dorms in the Wilbur 
dorm complex of Stanford University. Participants of the two groups resided in different dorms, 
and thus were unaware of the other condition. Freshman students were recruited since their 
assignment to dorms within the Wilbur complex is largely random, thus controlling for a number 
of possible confounds. 
 
Procedure 
  Prospective participants were approached when they were either in their rooms or 
elsewhere in the dorm. Participants were invited to participate in a economics research study on 
“student eating habits.” Participants in the no-choice condition were given 10 candies at the 
beginning of the study, for which they had to pay us 50 cents each; they could eat as many of the 
candies as they wanted and the number of candies consumed were replaced at the beginning of 
the following week at a cost of 50 cents each again; at the end of the quarter, all candies 
remaining in their possession were bought back and they received $20 for participation. 
Participants in the choice condition went through an identical procedure except that they could 
choose the number of candies every week, with the conditions that the number of candies that Krishna Savani  15  May 10, 2005 
 
they possess should be in multiples of 2 and that they should possess a minimum of 2 candies 
from the second week onwards.  
  The study was conducted over 7 weeks. Each week, a research assistant visited the 
participants to either replenish their stock of candies or to let them choose more candies. 
Research assistants were unable to locate some participants in some of the weeks, so there were 
some missing data points. 
  We had two different types of candies: unhealthy candies (Snickers, Kitkat, Twix, 
M&M’s, and Lays chips) and healthy candies (granola bars and dried fruits). With a few 
exceptions, participants in the no-choice condition were given 6 unhealthy candies and 4 
unhealthy candies each week whereas participants in the choice condition were free to choose the 
proportion of the two candies. 
 
6. Results 
  The unit of observation was each participant’s consumption profile for each week, 
yielding a total of 476 observations from 38 participants, one for each of 7 weeks. Data for 69 
records, which is 14.5% of the total number of observations, was missing. 
 
Candies possessed 
  In support of hypothesis 1, participants in the choice condition chose 3.53 candies on 
average, per week. They possessed significantly fewer candies than the no-choice participants, 
who were given 10 candies every week (z = 17.81, p < .001 by the Mann-Whitney test).  
  Participants in the choice condition chose more unhealthy candies (M = 2.15) than 
healthy candies (M = 1.38), a difference that was significant by the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (z Krishna Savani  16  May 10, 2005 
 
= 2.14, p < .05). In terms of percentages, 44% of the candies that the choice participants chose 
were healthy whereas 56% were unhealthy. These percentages did not different from those 
assigned to the no-choice participants: 40% healthy and 60% healthy (z = .09, p > .9 by the 
Mann-Whitney test). See Figures 1 and 2 for the number and proportion of unhealthy and healthy 
candies possessed by the two groups. 
 
Candies consumed 
  Contrary to hypothesis 2, participants in the choice group consumed more candies than 
those in the no-choice group (M = 1.00 vs. M = .70), although choice participants possessed only 
a third as many candies as no-choice participants. The difference held for both unhealthy candies 
(M = .64 vs. M = .46) and healthy candies (M = .36 vs. M = .24). All differences were significant 
by the Mann-Whitney test (z = 4.12, p < .000; z = 2.59, p = .01; z = 2.77, p < .01). 
  A Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed that both groups of participants consumed more 
unhealthy candies than healthy candies (M = .55 vs. M = .30; z = 3.94, p < .001). Further 
analyses revealed that the percentage of candies consumed that were unhealthy (or healthy) were 
no different for the two groups (z = .72, p > .4 by the Mann-Whitney test). Clearly, choice 
participants consumed a greater percentage of the total, unhealthy, and healthy candies that they 
possessed than no-choice participants (z’s > 5.96, p’s < .001 by the Mann-Whitney test). See 
Figures 3 and 4 for the number and proportion of unhealthy and healthy candies consumed by the 
two groups. 
    
Consumption over successive weeks 
  For analysis over successive weeks, I used the multinomial logistic regression with the Krishna Savani  17  May 10, 2005 
 
number of the week and the gender of the participant as independent variables. In support of 
hypothesis 3, participants in the choice condition chose more candies with successive weeks of 
the study (χ
2(7) = 66.38, p < .001). As predicted by hypothesis 4, of all candies chosen by choice 
participants in each week, the proportion of unhealthy candies increased with successive weeks 
(χ
2(7) = 23.99, p < .01). 
   A logistic regression with the total number of candies consumed in each week as the 
dependent variable revealed that participants in the choice group consumed more candies with 
successive weeks of the study, in partial support of hypothesis 5 (χ
2(6) = 24.19, p < .001). But 
participants in the no-choice group consumed fewer candies with successive weeks, in 
contradiction to my predictions (χ
2(8) = 17.02, p < .05). Analyzing consumption of unhealthy 
and healthy candies separately over successive weeks, I found that consumption of neither 
unhealthy nor healthy candy differed by successive weeks for participants in the no-choice 
group, but participants in the choice group ate more unhealthy candies with successive weeks 
(χ
2(6) = 17.92, p < .005). Yielding mixed support for hypothesis 6, the percentage of unhealthy 
candies from all candies consumed increased for the choice group across successive weeks (χ
2(3) 
= 15.1, p < .005) but it in fact decreased for the no-choice group (χ
2(8) = 16.21, p < .05).  
  The above analyses also revealed that women ate fewer candies than men on average. See 
figures 5 to 9 for graphs of candies consumed over successive weeks. 
 
7. Discussion 
  Participants in the choice group seem to have chosen only a few candies every week 
because they wanted to limit their consumption. But the results are paradoxical: although 
participants in the choice group possessed only a third as many candies than those in the no-Krishna Savani  18  May 10, 2005 
 
choice group, they consumed more candies than the no-choice participants. But the results from 
the choice group are consistent with cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) and the results 
from the no-choice group are consistent with reactance theory (Brehm 1956), both from social 
psychology. I return to these theories below. 
  The trends over successive weeks indicate that students in the choice group did suffer 
from self-control problems and that their hyperbolic discounting exacerbated as they had more 
stress from coursework: choice participants both chose and consumed more unhealthy candies 
with successive weeks, but not more healthy candies. Surprisingly, participants in the no-choice 
group consumed fewer candies with successive weeks, a finding to which I will return later. 
 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
  Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) claims that people are motivated to 
maintain congruence between their attitudes and beliefs and their actions. Therefore, whenever 
participants are subtly induced to engage in a counter-attitudinal behavior such that they are 
unaware of the external pressure, participants later tend to change their attitudes to be in 
congruence with their behavior.  
  In a classic demonstration of this phenomenon, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) brought 
students in the lab and asked them to perform a boring and repetitive task for an hour. When 
participants were about to leave at the end of the experiment, the experimenter requested them to 
tell the next subject who was just coming in that the task was very interesting. Participants were 
paid either $1 or $20 for lying to the next subject, which served as the key manipulation. After 
participants lied to the next subject, they rated the extent to which they enjoyed the experiment. 
The intuitive prediction would be that participants who received $20 would feel better about the Krishna Savani  19  May 10, 2005 
 
experiment than those who received $1, and therefore would rate the experiment as more 
enjoyable. But as hypothesized by the authors, the results were exactly the opposite: participants 
who received $1 rated the experiment as more enjoyable than participants who received $20. 
  The authors claim that after being induced by the experimenter to lye to the next subject, 
participants try to justify their action to themselves. Now participants who received $20 for lying 
had a good reason for lying and could justify their action to themselves, so they did not need to 
change their attitudes towards the experiment. But participant who received $1 did not have any 
good reason for lying and could not justify why they engaged in the behavior, so they changed 
their attitudes towards the experiment to absolve themselves from the act of lying without a good 
reason. The process of attitude change after insufficient justification occurs largely, or even 
completely, outside of participants’ awareness (Nisbett and Wilson 1977).  
  In another important experimental paradigm in cognitive dissonance, participants are 
asked to rank a number of items, such as CDs (see Steele, Spencer, and Lynch 1993) and are 
then offered a choice between the 5
th and 6
th ranked CDs. Since the rankings of the CDs are quite 
close, participants may not particularly prefer one CD over the other. After they have made a 
choice, participants rank the CDs once again and typically increase their liking for the chosen 
CD and decrease their liking for the rejected CD. Cognitive dissonance experiments show that 
people in European American contexts have a need to justify their actions of choosing one CD 
and rejecting another CD; they do so by increasing their liking for the chosen CD and decreasing 
their liking for the rejected CD
1.  
  In the present experiment, the behavior of the choice group is consistent with cognitive 
dissonance theory. Choice participants themselves chose the candies that they wanted to keep for 
                                                 
1 But see Heine and Lehman (1997) and Kitamama, Snibbe, Markus, and Suzuki (2004) for the absence of the usual 
cognitive dissonance effect in Japanese cultural contexts. See Snibbe and Markus (2005) for variation in the 
cognitive dissonance effect by social class. Krishna Savani  20  May 10, 2005 
 
the following week; therefore, they may have felt a need to justify their behavior, which they 
accomplish by consuming some of the chosen candies. Over successive weeks, depletion of self-
control (Muraven and Baumeister 2000) augments the cognitive dissonance effect, leading 
participants both to choose and to consume an increasing number of candies. In addition, 
participants may suffer from some dissonance because they did not consume all of their chosen 
candies every week; this dissonance may accumulate and thereby instigate them to consume a 
greater proportion of candies as the quarter progressed. In contrast, participants in the no-choice 
condition were not given any choice of candies; they were assigned some candies by the 
experimenter every week. Therefore, no-choice participants did not have any occasion to face 
cognitive dissonance. Nevertheless, the high self-restraint of the no-choice choice participants 
begs for an explanation, which I offer below. 
 
Reactance Theory 
  The theory of reactance in social psychology holds that whenever people’s freedom or 
right of choice is threatened, they are motivated to restore their freedom to affirm their 
independence and agency (Brehm 1956; Wicklund 1974). In classic reactance experiments, 
participants are asked to choose from a number of objects but then the experimenter denies their 
choice and assigns them a different object. People typically reassert themselves by increasing 
their liking for the chosen but denied object and decreasing their liking for the unchosen but 
possessed object (e.g., Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, and Shaban 1966; Hammock and Brehm 1966)
2.  
  People may feel threatened not only when their choice has been usurped but also when 
their choice has been pre-empted. For example, Snibbe, Savani, and Markus (2005) asked 
                                                 
2 But see Snibbe and Markus (2005) for an absence of reactance in working class contexts and Snibbe, Savani, and 
Markus (2005) for an absence of reactance in Indian cultural contexts. Krishna Savani  21  May 10, 2005 
 
participants in their free choice condition to choose one of 5 pens for themselves and to rate how 
much they liked the pen. But participants in the pre-empted choice condition were assigned a pen 
by the experimenter and asked to test and evaluate that pen. Snibbe et al. found that middle-class 
European American participants liked the assigned pen less than the chosen pen, thereby 
qualitatively replicating the standard reactance effect without actually usurping their participants’ 
choice. Therefore, not providing someone with choice is enough to threaten their freedom and to 
induce freedom-asserting reactions. 
  In the present study, participants in the no-choice group had their choice of candies pre-
empted; they were assigned a number of candies by the experimenter and were not given any 
choice in the candies that they possess. These participants could have expressed reactance to pre-
emption of their choice by reducing their liking for the assigned candies, as in standard reactance 
experiments. Just as cognitive dissonance can accumulate over an extended period of time, 
perhaps so can reactance. No-choice participants may be repeatedly feeling threatened week after 
week and as a consequences, consume fewer and fewer of the candies over successive weeks. 
These participants probably suffered from some depletion of self-control, so the effects of 
reactance seem strong enough to counter the effects of reduced self-control in certain 
circumstances, such as those of our experiment. 
 
Conclusion 
  The results of the study failed to support the primary hypothesis of the paper, that people 
who are given the choice to curtail the availability of food will indeed avail of that opportunity 
and as a consequence consume less food in the future. Although participants in the choice group 
did restrict the availability of food, they ended up consuming more food than participants in the Krishna Savani  22  May 10, 2005 
 
no-choice group. The surprising results suggest that social psychological factors interact with 
hyperbolic discounting in the domain of self-control. Future research should attempt to 
disentangle the effect of different factors involved in the prediction and exercise of self-control 
and identify boundary conditions for when certain factors will override others. Krishna Savani  23  May 10, 2005 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Average number of candies possessed per week. 
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Figure 2. Unhealthy and healthy candies as a percentage of total candies possessed per week. 
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Figure 3. Average number of candies consumed per week. 
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Figure 4. Unhealthy and healthy candies as a percentage of total candies consumed per week. 
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Figure 5. Total number of candies consumed over successive weeks. 
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Figure 6. Number of unhealthy candies consumed over successive weeks. 
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Figure 7. Number of healthy candies consumed over successive weeks. 
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Figure 8. Unhealthy candies as a percentage of total candies consumed over successive weeks. 
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Figure 9. Healthy candies as a percentage of total candies consumed over successive weeks. 
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Abstract 
 
The endowment effect refers to a market anomaly in which owners of objects value their 
possessions more than non-owners, in contradiction to predictions of neoclassical economic 
theory. Many behavioral economists believe that the endowment effect occurs because of loss 
aversion. I test three hypotheses in this project: 1) that the endowment effect would be partially 
caused by possession of an object rather than mere ownership of the object; 2) that the 
endowment effect would be attenuated in Indian cultural contexts as compared to European 
American cultural contexts; and 3) that people who choose an object will value the object more 
than people who just own the object but had not chosen the object. 
 
Keywords: endowment effect, willingness to pay, willingness to accept, ownership, possession, 
choice, culture, India 
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1: Introduction 
The endowment effect is a robust finding in behavioral economics that contradicts 
important predictions of neoclassical economic theory (Thaler 1980). The endowment effect 
refers to people’s tendency to base price valuation of commodities on their initial endowments. 
In many demonstrations of the endowment effect in the laboratory, potential sellers of 
commodities demand much more money to sell their commodities than potential buyers of those 
commodities are willing to pay (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). Similarly, a large 
majority of participants who are randomly endowed with one object, like a mug, do not want to 
exchange their endowed object for another equally valuable object, like a pen (e.g., Knetsch and 
Sinden 1984). The endowment effect violates the Coase theorem, which implies that valuations 
of objects should be independent of initial endowments, subject only to income effects and 
transaction costs, which are negligible in experimental settings. 
  Many researchers believe the endowment effect to be a manifestation of loss aversion, as 
outlined in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), which is one of the most widely 
accepted theories of bounded rationality. Prospect theory states that people’s choices follow two 
prominent patterns: loss aversion and asymmetric risk aversion. According to loss aversion, the 
negative utility of a loss exceeds the positive utility of an equivalent gain, in Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) formulation. And while neoclassical economic theory assumes that people are 
risk averse over all states of wealth, prospect theory claims that people are risk averse for gains 
from their current state of wealth and risk seeking for losses from their current state of wealth. 
Loss aversion is a sufficient condition for the endowment effect. 
  While claiming that the endowment effect reflects an increase in valuation of an object 
due to ownership, researchers have failed to disentangle the effects of possession and ownership. Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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The endowment effect may be caused by information asymmetry rather than by ownership, as 
owners of an object also have more information about the object than non-owners. I test the 
hypothesis that the endowment effect is partially mediated by possession. 
  Proponents of prospect theory believe that all human beings behave according to prospect 
theory in the domains predicted by the theory, assuming psychic unity of humankind (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979; Kahneman et al. 1990). But the nature and meaning of selves differs widely 
across cultural contexts. According to cultural psychological research on the self (Markus and 
Kitayama 1991), people engaged in Western cultural contexts, and particularly in middle-class 
European American cultural contexts, tend to hold an independent construal of the self, 
according to which the self is autonomous, stable, and made up of unique internal attributes and 
preferences. People from many Asian cultural contexts, in contrast, often hold an interdependent 
construal of the self, according to which the self is inherently interconnected with others, 
contextually variable, and made up of relationships with others. Based on this stream of research, 
I hypothesize that people engaged in Indian cultural contexts may not exhibit the endowment 
effect to the same extent because they may not form as strong preferences for the endowed 
object. 
  My studies may show that the endowment effect is a cultural construction and that 
prospect theory may not hold for people engaged in other cultural contexts. Many neoclassical 
economists and bounded rationality economists do not believe that cultural contexts play a big 
role in microeconomic behavior. But from the alternate perspective of cultural psychology, 
people do not exist in isolation from their socio-cultural environments. As preliminary 
psychological research demonstrates, people engaged in different cultural contexts differ 
psychologically from each other in very significant ways, even at the level of basic cognition Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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(Markus and Kitayama 1991). Therefore, people engaged in different cultural contexts may also 
differ from each other in their microeconomic behavior.  
  In their daily lives, people usually choose the objects that are in their possession and are 
not often assigned objects by external agents, as in endowment effect experiments. Since choice 
has significant motivational benefits for people engaging in European American cultural contexts 
(Deci and Ryan 1985, 1991), the act of choosing an object may lead to an increase in valuation 
beyond the endowment effect. Nevertheless, choice may be less important and less self-relevant 
to people engaging in interdependent cultural contexts (Iyengar and Lepper 1999), who may not 
value chosen objects more than assigned objects. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature, section 3 describes the study designs and hypotheses, section 4 outlines the detailed 
methods, section 5 discusses the results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
  The endowment effect was discovered when a number of hypothetical and real contingent 
valuation studies discovered a wide gap between willingness to accept (WTA or selling price) 
and willingness to pay (WTP or buying price) for many different types of commodity. Thaler 
(1980) labeled the WTA-WTP disparity as the endowment effect because entitlements seemed to 
affect value. Early hypothetical studies found WTA-WTP disparities for fishing (Sinclair 1978) 
and hunting permits (Bishop and Heberlein 1979), for example, while some studies discovered 
the endowment effect with real payoffs for lottery tickets (Knetsch and Sinden 1984) and sodium 
octa-acetate (Coursey, Hovis, and Schulz 1987). Early studies merely demonstrated the WTA-
WTP disparity but some researchers (Knetsch and Sinden 1984; Thaler 1980) explained the Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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disparity in terms of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
  In one of the most cited papers on the endowment effect, Kahneman et al. (1990) 
demonstrated the endowment effect under careful experimental control. They used the incentive 
compatible value elicitation method designed by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964), gave 
participants the opportunity to learn by repeating the value elicitation task a number of times, 
used real payoffs for a randomly selected subset of trials, and suggested to the participants that 
they reveal their true valuations. The authors found a significant endowment effect: WTA was 
significantly higher than WTP in all experiments. As predicted, the authors failed to discover an 
effect of learning, as participants exhibited the endowment effect in all trial rounds did not 
exhibit a convergence of WTA and WTP over repeated trials. The authors thus concluded that 
the endowment effect and loss aversion are fundamental characteristics of preferences 
(Kahneman et al. 1990, p. 1346). 
 
Learning effects 
  The effect of learning (through repeated trials) on the endowment effect has been often 
debated in the literature. Coursey et al. (1987) suggested that learning may close the WTA-WTP 
gap, as individuals are not familiar with value elicitation tasks and thus need opportunities to 
learn from the consequences of their decisions. In addition, participants may get the opportunity 
to discover their true preferences during repeated valuation tasks (Plott 1996), or even learn that 
the dominant strategy response is to reveal their true valuation with an incentive compatible 
elicitation procedure. Kahneman et al. (1990) did not find any learning effects, but Shogren, 
Shin, Hayes, and Kliebenstein (1994) report that the endowment effect disappeared in their 
experiments after a series of trials. Similarly, in the experiments of Plott and Zeiler Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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(forthcoming), the WTP that was in fact higher than WTA after 14 practice rounds, although not 
significantly so. In a recent meta-analysis, Sayman and Oncular (2003) found that the WTA-
WTP gap decreases with practice rounds but is not eliminated. The effect of learning on the 
endowment effect is not yet clear, although evidence suggests that practice attenuates the 
endowment effect.  
 
Framing effects 
  In addition to learning effects, some researchers have suggested that the framing of the 
task may also influence the endowment effect. Kahneman et al. (1990) and other researchers 
explicitly mention “buying,” “selling,” and “prices” in their experiments, leading some 
researchers to suggest that the endowment effect may be a consequence of strategic 
misrepresentation by participants. Subjects may be following the common maxim to buy low and 
to sell high, thus inflating WTA and deflating WTP. Franciosi, Kujal, Michelitsch, Smith, and 
Deng (1996) control for this type of strategic misrepresentation by avoiding any references to 
“buying,” “selling,” and “prices.” In their studies, owners of mugs were asked to choose between 
keeping their mug and receiving money for a range of monetary amounts, while non-owners 
were asked to choose between receiving a mug and receiving money for the same amounts. The 
authors discover a significant endowment effect, but the WTA-WTP disparity was attenuated 
compared to that in previous studies. Comparing their results with those of Kahneman et al. 
(1990), the authors discover a decrease in WTA and an increase in WTP. Franciosi et al. (1996) 
demonstrate that subject misperceptions about strategic behavior are one of the causes of the 
endowment effect, and can be suitably remedied. 
 Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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Incentive compatibility 
  Most researchers have used incentive compatible value elicitation methods in endowment 
effect experiments, such as the Becker et al. (1964) method (Loewenstein and Issacharoff 1994; 
Kahneman et al. 1990), a Vickery auction (Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler 2001; Shogren et al. 
1994), or a sealed bid auction (Franciosi et al. 1996), in contrast to many contingent valuation 
studies that did not use incentive compatible methods (e.g., Brookshire and Coursey 1987; 
Coursey et al. 1987; Knetsch and Sinden 1984). The overall effects of using an incentive 
compatible method or a non-incentive compatible method are not clear: the meta-analysis of 
Horowitz and McConnell (2002) reports that incentive compatible methods increase the WTA-
WTP disparity, while the meta-analysis of Sayman and Onculer (2003) reports the opposite. 
Nevertheless, many researchers believe that the value elicited by an incentive compatible method 
is probably closer to the true value than that elicited by a non-incentive compatible method. 
There seems to be no systematic difference in the endowment effect due to the different types of 
incentive compatible methods used. 
 
Dominant strategy 
  Even if an incentive compatible value elicitation method is used, we cannot assume that 
all participants understand that revealing their true preferences is a dominant strategy. Most 
researchers did not inform subjects that they would be better off if they reveal their true value, 
while two researchers merely suggested that participants reveal their true value (Kahneman et al. 
1990; Shogren et al. 1994) and two other researchers carefully explained the dominant strategy 
to participants (Loewenstein and Issacharoff 1994; Plott and Zeiler, forthcoming). Plott and 
Zeiler (forthcoming) found that the endowment effect disappeared after the experimenter Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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carefully explained the dominant strategy to participants but Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) 
replicated the endowment effect even after a careful explanation. Although some theories of 
rationality would suggest that explaining the best response to participants is superfluous, we 
cannot assume that participants fully understand the consequence of stating false values with an 
incentive compatible value elicitation method. 
 
Hypothetical vs. real payoffs 
  A debate continues as to whether the endowment effect is sensitive to hypothetical versus 
real payoffs. Some researchers asked participants to give hypothetical WTA and WTP valuations 
(Boyce, Brown, McClelland, Peterson, and Schulz 1992; Knetsch 1989), some paid participants 
for all trial rounds (Harless 1989; Plott and Zeiler, forthcoming), while others paid participants 
for a randomly selected subset of trial rounds (Kahneman et al. 1990; Shogren et al. 1994). In 
their meta-analysis, Horowitz and McConnell (2002) find that the WTA-WTP disparity was not 
sensitive to whether payoffs were real or hypothetical, but Plott and Zeiler (forthcoming) insist 
that it is important to pay participants for all trial rounds to encourage learning from practice. 
 
Substitution effects 
  Many researchers consider the endowment effect to be a manifestation of loss aversion 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), according to which the negative utility of a loss exceeds the 
positive utility of an equivalent gain. Sellers consider selling their possession as a loss while 
buyers consider buying an object as a gain, thus resulting in the observed WTA-WTP disparity. 
But Hanemann (1991) showed that the endowment effect can be consistent with expected utility 
theory if the elasticity of substitution of the good under consideration is low, such that there are Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
 
8
only a few substitutes for the good. WTA-WTP studies have considered many different types of 
goods, from hunting permits, chances of death, and sucrose octa-acetate, to eggs, pens, and 
mugs, which have widely different elasticities of substitution. Horowitz and McConnell (2002) 
find that the WTA-WTP ratio is lower for goods that are market goods with close substitutes 
(like pens, mugs, and chocolates) than for goods that are non-market goods (like hunting permits 
and chances of death). But nevertheless, the endowment effect is highly significant for ordinary 
goods, in contrast to Hanemann’s (1991) claims. 
 
Temporal variations 
  All the endowment effect studies referenced above demonstrated the instantaneous 
endowment effect: the WTA-WTP disparity surfaced as soon as some of the subjects were 
endowed with an object. Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) studied changes in WTA and WTP 
after people possessed the objects for different durations. They call their first hypothesis the 
“duration of ownership effect:” a participant’s selling price would increase as a function of how 
long the participant has currently possessed the object. Their second hypothesis is called the 
“duration of prior ownership effect:” a participant’s buying price for a previously owned object 
will increase as a function of how long the participant had previously possessed the object. Their 
third hypothesis was titled as the “time elapsed since loss effect:” a participant’s buying price for 
a previously owned object will decrease as a function of how long ago the participant lost the 
object. The authors find significant support for their first and second hypotheses and marginally 
significant support for their third hypothesis. 
 Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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Reference point 
  According to the reference dependent model derived from prospect theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991), people assess gains and losses from a neutral reference point that consists of 
all their owned non-monetary goods. Participants endowed with an object shift their reference 
point to include the endowed object, so they consider giving up the object as a loss from the new 
reference point. But participants not endowed with the object are at a reference point that does 
not include the object, so they consider acquiring the objects as a gain. As the negative utility of 
a loss exceeds the positive utility of an equivalent gain according to prospect theory, the 
endowment effect occurs.  
  Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) explain their results in terms of the reference 
dependent model (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). They conclude that participants gradually 
incorporate the endowed object in their reference point, which consists of all their current 
possessions and endowments. Participants exhibit the instantaneous endowment effect by 
partially incorporating the endowed object in their reference point, thus causing an instantaneous 
shift in their reference point. This partial incorporation occurs as soon as the participant is 
endowed with the object, resulting in the instantaneous endowment effect. But participants fully 
incorporate the object in their reference point only gradually over time. Similarly, the loss of an 
object leads to a partial but instantaneous shift in reference point, but the object is fully removed 
from the reference point only gradually with time. 
 
Participants’ misperceptions 
  Denying the reference point explanation of the endowment effect, Plott and Zeiler 
(forthcoming) have claimed that the endowment is merely a consequence of subject Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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misperceptions. The authors conducted endowment effect studies using extensive measures to 
avoid subject misperceptions, such as using an incentive compatible value elicitation method, 
carefully explaining to participants their optimal response, providing participants with 14 trial 
rounds, paying participants for all practice rounds to reinforce learning, avoiding references to 
“buying” and “selling,” and using a double blind methodology to maintain full anonymity of the 
participants. Under these conditions, the authors discover that the endowment effect disappears 
and that the WTA-WTP disparity is reversed, with WTP non-significantly higher than WTA. But 
the surprising reversal of the WTA-WTP gap makes replicability of their results questionable.  
 
Asymmetrical information and the “possession effect” 
  In most endowment effect studies conducted in the lab, one group of participants gets to 
see an object (like a pen or a mug) one person at a time, following which these participants give 
their WTP for the object. I refer to this group as the “viewing group” because participants in this 
group merely view the object. Another group of participants is given the object by the 
experimenter; all participants in this group have the object in their possession and they own the 
object; these participants give their WTA for the object. I refer to this group as the “ownership 
group” because participants in this group own the object. 
  Researchers claim that the endowment effect occurs because of differences in ownership 
rights: participants in the ownership group own a pen whereas those in the viewing group have 
merely seen a sample of the pen. Nevertheless, researchers have overlooked another important 
difference between the two groups: participants in the ownership group have possessed the pen 
for a substantially longer time than those in the viewing group (a few minutes as compared to a 
few seconds); therefore, asymmetrical information may also account for the endowment effect, Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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and is indeed a more parsimonious explanation for the effect. My thorough literature review on 
endowment effect studies failed to locate a singe paper that has examined asymmetrical 
information as an explanation for the effect. Therefore, I conducted a study (reported below) to 
disentangle the effects of possession (and thereby asymmetrical information) and ownership in 
the endowment effect. I created a “possession group” in which participants possessed an object 
just as those in the ownership group but the ownership rights of the object had not yet been 
transferred to the participants. 
 
The endowment effect and preferences 
  Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) showed that the shift in the reference point from 
previously owned goods to previously owned goods plus the endowed object occurs gradually 
with time. But there is a partial, instantaneous shift, which causes the endowment effect. 
Different people may take different amounts of time to shift their reference point to fully 
incorporate the endowed object in the set of all their owned non-monetary goods. The findings of 
Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) indicate that a prolonged underlying psychological 
mechanism mediates the endowment effect. Nevertheless, Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) 
do not suggest a psychological mechanism that determines when and to what extent will an 
object be incorporated in the reference point. I propose that the endowment effect and the 
corresponding shift in the reference point are mediated by the degree to which participants form 
preferences for the endowed object (see Rosenberg 1979).  
 
Preferences and the self 
  According to the independent self-construal that is widely distributed in European Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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American cultural contexts (Markus and Kitayama 1991), the self is constructed and maintained 
as a “a bounded, unique, more or less integrated, motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic 
centre of awareness, emotion, judgment and action, organized into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively against other such wholes, and against a social and natural background” (Geertz 
1975, p. 48). Such selves are primarily constructed and defined in terms of stable internal 
attributes, such as preferences, dispositions, and psychological tendencies, and indeed 
conceptualized as preference structures (Shweder, Much, and Mahapatra 1997). One of most 
important ways in which independent selves are maintained and affirmed is by developing and 
expressing their internal attributes and preferences, whether pre-existing or constructed (Kim 
2002; Kim and Drolet 2003; Kim and Markus 1999). 
  In contrast to the independent self-construal, many Asian cultural contexts afford an 
interdependent mode of being, one in which the self is constructed and maintained as distributed 
across the social and non-social environments and experienced in relationships with other 
people. Since others may participate in the subjectivities of interdependent selves (Markus and 
Kitayama 1994), Shweder et al (1997) called such selves relationship-structures. Interdependent 
selves are maintained and affirmed by actively relating to other people (Heine, Lehman, Markus, 
and Kitayama 1999; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, and Norasakkunkit 1997; Miller and 
Bersoff 1992; Shweder and Bourne 1984). 
  As preferences are central to the definition of independent selves, people in European 
American cultural contexts may form relatively strong preferences for their owned objects within 
short time. In contrast, if preferences are not particularly self-relevant to people engaging in 
Indian cultural contexts, Indians may form relatively weak preferences for their owned objects. 
Lending indirect support to this claim, Savani and Markus (2005) found that preferences for Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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individual items predict choice among those items to a lesser extent in Indian contexts than in 
European American contexts. If construction of preferences mediates the endowment effect, the 
effect may be significantly attenuated in Indian contexts, which I have tested as part of this 
project. 
 
The importance of choice 
  Stanford endowment effect studies lack mundane realism in one important way: people 
are usually not endowed with objects by an external agent, but choose their endowments for 
themselves. Possibly, the mere act of choosing can widen the WTA-WTP disparity caused by the 
endowment effect.  
  Decades of research in social psychology have repeatedly demonstrated the substantial 
motivational benefits of choice for people engaging in European American cultural contexts 
(e.g., Brehm 1956; Deci 1975; Deci and Ryan 1985, 1991; Taylor and Brown 1988). As choice is 
the primary means of expressing unique internal attributes and preferences of the self (Markus 
and Kitayama 1991), choice is essential for people holding independent self-construals. But 
personal choice is probably not very important for people with interdependent modes of being, as 
there are not many internal attributes to express, not many preferences to disclose (Iyengar and 
Lepper 1999; Markus and Kitayama 2004; Snibbe, Savani, and Markus 2005).  
Iyengar and Lepper (1999) demonstrated that personal choice has substantial 
motivational benefits for people in European American contexts but not for those in East Asian 
American contexts. In their studies, European American participants were more motivated to 
complete a task and were more engaged in the task when they personally made the choice than 
when a significant other made the choice. But East Asian American participants were more Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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motivated when a significant other made the choice than when they personally made the choice. 
Further research in the cognitive dissonance paradigm (Festinger 1957) has revealed additional 
cross-cultural differences in the importance of choice. 
  Cognitive dissonance refers to people’s tendency to increase their liking for chosen items 
and to decrease their liking for unchosen items after they have made a choice. In typical 
cognitive dissonance experiments, participants are asked to rank a number of objects according 
to their preferences. Participants are then asked to choose between the fifth and the sixth ranked 
objects as a gift for participating in the experiment. Participants then rank all objects again. 
Demonstrating the cognitive dissonance effect, participants typically increase the rank of the 
chosen item and decrease the rank of the unchosen item.  
  Psychologists believe that the cognitive dissonance effect occurs primarily because 
choices are self-definitional and are supposed to reflect preferences; therefore, people engaging 
in independent cultural contexts are motivated to maintain a preference-attitude consistency. But 
as neither preferences nor choices are particularly important or self-relevant to people with 
interdependent self-construals, a number of researchers have failed to replicate the cognitive 
dissonance effect in East Asian cultural contexts (Heine and Lehman 1997; Kitayama, Snibbe, 
Markus, and Suzuki 2004). 
 
The “choice effect” 
Since choice has substantial motivational benefits for people engaging in European 
American cultural contexts, perhaps the mere act of choosing an object can lead to an increase in 
the valuation of that object. That is, the endowment effect may be magnified when people have 
chosen an object than when they have been assigned an object. An increase in valuation due to Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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choosing can be termed as the “choice effect.” 
  In people’s daily lives, the choice effect is confounded with the endowment effect 
because people choose objects and simultaneously become endowed with those objects. Past 
studies have measured the pure endowment effect by precluding participants from choosing. I 
conducted a study to measure the pure choice effect. 
 
3. Design and hypotheses 
Study 1 
  My first study aimed at disentangling the contributions of possession and ownership to 
the endowment effect. There were 3 conditions in the study: the viewing condition, the 
ownership condition, and the possession condition. As in standard endowment effect 
experiments, participants in the viewing condition viewed a pen that was passed among them, 
one person at a time. Participants in the ownership condition were given a pen and were told that 
the pen was theirs to keep, again as in standard experiments. In the novel possession condition, 
participants were given a pen but the ownership of the pen was not transferred to them. 
Participants in the viewing and possession condition indicated whether wanted to receive the pen 
or to receive money for a range of monetary amounts, whereas participants in the ownership 
condition indicated whether they wanted to keep their pen or to receive money for the same 
amounts. Participants’ valuations of the pen were determined from their responses. 
  I expected that there would be a significant difference in pen valuations between viewing 
and ownership conditions, replicating the standard endowment effect. Crucially, I also 
hypothesized that the endowment effect is partially mediated by possession, that valuations 
would be significantly higher in the possession condition as compared to the viewing condition, Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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and in the ownership condition as compared to the possession condition. 
 
Study 2 
  My second study tested whether the endowment effect was attenuated in Indian cultural 
contexts. Therefore, I conducted the standard endowment effect experiment in India and also ran 
the possession condition to verify that the endowment effect is partially mediated by possession 
in both cultural contexts. 
  I hypothesized that the magnitude of the usual endowment effect (the difference between 
mean WTA and WTP) would be smaller in Indian contexts than in European American contexts. 
In addition, I hypothesized that valuations would be significantly higher in the possession 
condition as compared to the viewing condition, and in the ownership condition as compared to 
the possession condition in Indian contexts, as in European American contexts. 
 
Study 3 
  My third study tested for the choice effect. Participants in the choice condition had to 
choose one of two identical pens. The condition taps the pure choice effect, since participants in 
the choice conditions will possess precisely the same pens as those in the ownership condition; 
the only difference is that participants in the ownership condition were given a pen by the 
experimenter whereas those in the choice condition chose their pen, even though the choice was 
completely trivial and illusory. Past research has shown that even trivial and illusory choice can 
have substantial motivational benefits in American cultural contexts (Cordova and Lepper 1996; 
Langer 1975; Langer and Rodin 1976). Participants in the choice condition would give their 
valuations just as in the ownership condition. Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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  I hypothesized that valuations in the choice condition will be significantly higher than 
valuations in the ownership condition for European American participants, demonstrating the 
choice effect. In addition, I hypothesized that Indian participants will not exhibit the choice 
effect. 
 
4. Methods 
Study 1 
  A total of 93 Stanford undergraduate students participated in study 1, with 31 participants 
in each of the three conditions. The study was conducted in lounges in the students’ dorms in 
groups of 5 to 15 participants. Participants were recruited for the experiment from their rooms or 
from other dorm spaces. Each experimental session took 10 to 15 minutes. 
  I closely replicated the methods of Kahneman et al.’s (1990) study 5. I used pens as the 
endowed commodity in this and all subsequent experiments. I chose pens instead of other 
commonly used objects, such as mugs and chocolates, because Indian college students use pens 
for writing all the time and therefore, value pens. All pens were enclosed in a transparent box so 
that participants could see the pen clearly. Pens used in this study were valued $4.95 at the 
Stanford bookstore. 
  Participants in the viewing condition had to choose between either receiving a pen or 
receiving different amounts of money and examined a sample of the pen one person at a time. 
Participants in the ownership condition were given a pen to keep by the experimenter and had to 
choose between either keeping their pen or receiving different amounts of money. Participants in 
the possession condition had to choose between either receiving a pen or receiving different 
amounts of money and were given a sample of the pen each for examination. Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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  Each participant had to choose between either receiving (keeping) the pen or receiving 
amounts of money ranging from 50 cents to $10 in 50 cent increments. To preclude strategic 
misrepresentation by subjects (Franciosi et al. 1996), there was no mention of “buying,” 
“selling,” or “prices.” Instead, all participants were asked to choose between the pen and money. 
Participants completed a standard demographic questionnaire after marking their preferences. 
  Once all participants had indicated their preferences, one of the amounts from the 20 
amounts listed ($5) was revealed as the “enforcement amount” and participants’ preferences 
were enforced at that amount: if they chose to receive the money at $5, they were given $5 and 
not the pen, and if they chose to get (keep) the pen at $5, they got (kept) the pen but not the 
money. Participants were informed of this enforcement mechanism before they indicated their 
preferences between the pen and money, but the enforcement amount was not revealed until all 
participants had marked their preferences.. 
 
Study 2 
  The second study replicated the methods of study 1 in India. A total of 90 college 
students participated in the study, with 30 in each condition. Participants were recruited at 
Ramnivas Ruia College in Mumbai, India. The students took part in the study during class hours 
at the request of their instructor. The study was conducted in the students’ classrooms in groups 
of 10 to 30 participants. Given more students in each session, the study took 20 to 30 minutes. 
  Within their respective conditions, all participants went through essentially identical 
procedures as in study 1. Indian participants were given pens that were bought at a local 
stationary store for Rupees 50 (the purchasing power equivalent of $5; see World Bank 2005). 
The choice amounts ranged from Rupees 10 to Rupees 100 in increments of Rupees 5. The Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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enforcement amount was Rupees 50.  
  The English versions of the questionnaires were translated into Hindi and then back-
translated into English by two independent bilingual translators (Brislin 1970). The original 
English version and the back-translated English version were comparable in meaning, thus 
ensuring equivalence of the English and Hindi versions of the questionnaire. 
 
Study 3 
  A total of 93 Indian students and 30 American students participated in study 3. There 
were 32 Indian participants in the viewing condition, 30 in the ownership condition, and 31 in 
the choice condition, whereas all 30 American participants were in the choice condition.  
  Since identical pens were used in the American part of this study and in study 1, I 
compared the choice condition in this study with the ownership and viewing conditions in study 
1. Since slightly different pens were used in the Indian part of this study and in study 2, I 
collected data for the viewing and ownership conditions in India once again. The new Indian 
pens were different from the pens used in study 2 in color and in value; they were of a slightly 
different shade of red and cost Rupees 60 as opposed to Rupees 50.  
  Indian participants in the viewing and ownership conditions went through the same 
procedures as those in the corresponding conditions of study 2. Participants in the U.S. and 
Indian choice conditions had to choose one of two identical pens for themselves and then had to 
choose between either keeping their pen or receiving different amounts of money. The pen that 
each participant rejected was kept separately and not offered to any other participant in that 
condition. The rest of the procedure was identical to that of the ownership condition.  
 Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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5. Results 
Study 1 
  Participants’ valuation of the pen was determined by averaging the last value at which 
they chose the pen and the first value at which they chose the money. Their true valuation would 
probably lie in between both values, so the average of the two values would be the best estimate 
of the two values. Data from one participant in the possession condition was excluded from the 
analysis because the participant preferred the pen to every monetary amount; this participants’ 
valuation of the pen fell beyond the range of the amounts listed. Unless specified otherwise, I 
used the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test to compare the distribution of valuations across 
different conditions in all studies. 
  I compared the distribution of valuations in the ownership and viewing conditions to 
verify replication of the standard endowment effect. Contrary to expectations, the two 
distributions were not statistically different (z = .47, p > .6). Similarly, the distribution of 
valuations in the possession condition was not different from that of the ownership condition (z = 
.52, p > .6) or from the viewing condition (z = .98, p > .3). 
  Although the distributions were not significantly different from each other, I compared 
mean valuations in each condition (see figure 1). Mean valuation in the viewing condition was 
$2.56 whereas that in the ownership condition was $3.20. The difference was 56 cents. 
Nevertheless, mean valuation in the possession condition ($3.00) was closer to mean valuation in 
the ownership condition than that in the viewing condition, suggesting that the endowment effect 
may be largely mediated by possession. In addition, the median valuation was identical in the 
ownership and possession conditions ($3.25) but higher than in the viewing condition ($2.75; see 
figure 2). Therefore, the results indicate that the endowment effect may largely occur because of Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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asymmetrical information and not so much due to loss aversion, as is widely claimed.  
 
Study 2 
  Participants’ valuations in the second study were determined just as in study 1. Data from 
5 participants was excluded because they either reported inconsistent preferences or preferred 
receiving (keeping) the pen to all amounts of money. 
  Contrary to predictions, I replicated the endowment effect with Indian participants: the 
distribution of valuations in the ownership condition was significantly different from that in the 
viewing condition (z = 2.20, p < .05). Unlike as in the US, the endowment effect was only 
slightly mediated by possession in India: the viewing condition was no different from the 
possession condition (z = .93, p > .3) whereas the difference between the ownership and 
possession conditions was marginally significant (z = 1.67, p < .1).  
  The pattern of means and medians supported this interpretation: mean valuation in the 
viewing condition was Rupees 36.07, followed by Rupees 34.82 in the possession condition and 
Rupees 41.64 in the ownership condition (see figure 1). The median valuation in the viewing 
condition was Rupees 27.50, followed by Rupees 32.50 in the possession condition and Rupees 
42.50 in the ownership condition (see figure 2). Therefore, the endowment effect in India seems 
to be somewhat mediated by possession, but to a lesser extent than in the U.S. Nevertheless, the 
results should be interpreted with caution because most tests failed to reach statistical 
significance. 
  To directly compare valuations across the two countries, I converted the Rupee 
valuations to their purchasing power equivalent in U.S. dollars. World Bank (2004) and Rafiq 
Dossani (personal communication, April 2004) suggest that Rupees 10 is approximately equal to Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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$1 in purchasing power terms. Therefore, I divided all Indian valuations by 10 to make them 
comparable to U.S. valuations. Since the procedures were identical in studies 1 and 2, I 
combined the data from both studies for analysis.  
  Upon submitting these scaled valuations to a 2 (culture) X 3 (condition) ANOVA, I 
found a main effect of culture (F (1,170) = 7.37, p < .01) and a main effect of condition (F (2, 
170) = 3.78, p < .05). Post-hoc contrasts revealed that Indian participants valued their pens more 
than American participants (M = 3.56 vs. 2.92) and that participants valued pens more in the 
ownership condition than in the viewing condition (M = 3.68 vs. 2.85; p < .05), replicating the 
standard endowment effect. No other contrasts reached significance. Contrary to my hypothesis, 
the predicted culture X condition interaction was far from significant (p > .7). The magnitude of 
the endowment effect was identical in both cultures (56 cents in both America and India). Mean 
and median valuations for the two groups are plotted together in figures 1 and 2, respectively.  
 
Study 3 
  I collected data for all three conditions (viewing, ownership, and choice) in India but only 
for the choice condition in the U.S. Since the procedures for the viewing and ownership 
conditions in India in this study were identical to those of the respective conditions in the U.S. in 
study 1, I combined the study 1 viewing and ownership data from the U.S. with data collected in 
the present study.  
  Comparing the distributions of valuations in the ownership and choice conditions, I failed 
to find the predicted choice effect with American participants (z = .39, p > .6). Mean valuation in 
the choice condition ($3.45) was somewhat higher than that in the ownership condition ($3.20; 
see figure 3). The difference in mean valuation between the choice and ownership conditions Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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($.25) was smaller than the difference in mean valuation between the ownership and viewing 
conditions ($.64). In addition, the median valuation was identical in the ownership and choice 
conditions ($3.25; see figure 4). Therefore, the hypothesized choice effect did not materialize in 
the U.S. 
  Similarly, as predicted, there was no choice effect in India; the distributions of valuations 
in the choice and ownership conditions were not different (z = 1.12, p > .2). Mean valuation in 
the choice condition (Rupees 41.47) was non-significantly less than that in the ownership 
condition (Rupees 44.18; see figure 3). Median valuation in the choice condition (Rupees 37.50) 
was somewhat less than that in the ownership condition (Rupees 42.50; see figure 4).  
  I made the Indian and American valuations comparable by using the same scaling 
procedure as in study 2. Upon submitting the scaled valuations to a 2 (culture) X 3 (condition) 
ANOVA, I found a main effect of culture (F (1, 173) = 7.59, p < .01) and a main effect of 
condition (F (2, 173) = 7.54, p = .001). Once again, the predicted culture X condition interaction 
failed to materialize (p > .3). As found in study 2, mean valuation was higher in India than in 
America (M = $3.81 vs. M = 3.07). Post-hoc contrasts revealed that mean valuation in the 
viewing condition was significantly lower than mean valuation in the ownership and choice 
conditions (p’s < .005), but the ownership and choice conditions were not significantly different 
from each other. Mean and median valuations for the two groups are plotted together in figures 3 
and 4. 
 
6. Discussion 
  The results weakly supported the first hypothesis of the paper, that the endowment effect 
is partially mediated by asymmetric information or possession. Although mean and median Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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valuations in the possession condition were closer to the respective valuations in the ownership 
condition than in the possession condition, the three conditions were not significantly different 
from each other. Nevertheless, the trends indicate that increase in value due to ownership is 
indeed partially mediated by possession. Future research should attempt to further disentangle 
the many contributors to the endowment effect. The results suggest that asymmetric information 
may be a bigger contributor to the endowment effect than loss aversion. 
  The possession effect in India was somewhat different from the possession effect in the 
U.S. The endowment effect was only slightly mediated by possession in Indian contexts; mean 
and median valuations in the possession condition were close to the respective valuations in the 
viewing condition than in the ownership condition. The findings suggest that asymmetric 
information has a smaller effect on valuation in Indian contexts than in American contexts. 
Future research should identify psychological processes that lead to this cultural disparity. 
  The results did not support my second hypothesis that the endowment effect will be 
attenuated in Indian contexts. The magnitude of the endowment effect (i.e., the difference 
between mean valuations in the viewing and ownership conditions) was an identical 56 cents in 
both cultures. Given higher variance in the American data than in the Indian data, the 
endowment effect was not significant in America but significant in India. 
  The hypothesized choice effect failed to materialize. There was no significant difference 
between the choice and the ownership conditions in the U.S., and although in the predicted 
direction, the magnitude of the difference between the choice and ownership conditions was 
smaller than the magnitude of the endowment effect. Nevertheless, it is hard to interpret the data 
since all three conditions were statistically the same in the U.S. As predicted, the choice effect 
did not occur in India. Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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  My failure to replicate the endowment effect in the U.S. is very surprising given the large 
number of published studies on the topic. Other researchers have found the endowment effect 
with fewer participants than in my study: Kahneman et al. (1990, study 1) found the endowment 
effect with 22 participants in each condition and Franciosi et al. (1996) found the endowment 
effect with merely 8 participants in each condition, compared to 31 participants in each condition 
of my study. In addition, the magnitude of the non-significant endowment effect in the U.S. is 
also unexpectedly small, since previous researchers found that mean valuation in the ownership 
condition was 2 to 3 times that in the viewing condition (e.g., Franciosi et al. 1996; Kahneman et 
al. 1990). 
  The failure to replicate the endowment effect suggests that some methodological 
problems could have plagued my studies. Most previous studies on the endowment effect were 
conducted either in classrooms or in the lab, both of which are highly controlled settings. In 
contrast, my studies in the U.S. were conducted in dorm lounges where students were 
individually requested to participate. The informal nature of the experiment, the lack of a 
controlled setting, and the experimenter’s perceived lack of authority could have introduced 
confounds that wiped out the endowment effect. This reason seems likely because I was able to 
replicate the endowment effect in India with identical procedures but in a controlled classroom 
environment where class instructors were present. 
  Given the unusual conditions under which these studies were conducted, the results 
should be interpreted with caution. Future research should carefully attempt to test for the 
possession effect and the choice effect in a controlled setting to accurately disentangle the effects 
of viewing, possession, owning, and choosing an object on its valuation. Krishna Savani    May 10, 2005 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Mean valuations in studies 1 and 2. 
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Figure 2. Median valuations in studies 1 and 2. 
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 Figure 3. Mean valuations in study 3. 
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Figure 4. Median valuations in study 3. 
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